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Post by mhbruin on Oct 11, 2020 8:48:24 GMT -8
The number on leads in the polls are from 538. The win percentages are from The Economist.
| EVs | BIDEN LEAD Oct 11 | BIDEN LEAD Oct 4 | BIDEN LEAD Sept 23 | BIDEN LEAD
Sept 12 | BIDEN LEAD
Sept 3 | BIDEN WIN% OCT 4 | BIDEN WIN% Oct 4 | BIDEN WIN% Sept 23 | BIDEN WIN% Sept 12 | BIDEN WIN% Sept 3 | | Arizona | 11 | 3.9% | 3.4% | 3.6% | 5.0% | 4.6% | 68% | 59% | 60% | 62%
| 65% | | Florida | 29 | 4.5% | 2.9% | 1.9% | 2.7% | 4.1% | 76% | 69% | 66% | 72% | 68% | | Georgia | 16 | 0.9% | 0.6% | -0.6% | -1.5% | -1.5% | 51% | 47% | 40% | 42% | 39% | | Iowa | 6 | 1.0% | -1.4% | -0.6% | -1.6% | -1.8% | 42% | 33% | 34% | 30% | 30% | | Maine | 4 | 15.3% | 15.0% | 16.6% | 10.9% | 9.7% | 99% | 99% | 98% | 97% | 94% | | Michigan | 16 | 8.0% | 6.9% | 7.4% | 7.6% | 6.4% | 93% | 90% | 89% | 88% | 82% | | Minnesota | 10 | 9.2% | 9.1% | 9.5% | 7.4% | 6.0% | 96% | 93% | 92% | 89% | 88% | | Nevada | 6 | 6.8% | 6.0% | 5.5% | 5.9% | 6.4% | 88% | 84% | 81% | 85% | 85% | | New Hampshire | 4 | 10.8% | 9.5% | 9.1% | 6.8% | 7.9% | 93% | 88% | 87% | 87% | 84% | | North Carolina | 15 | 2.9% | 1.4% | 1.4% | 1.4% | 1.8% | 67% | 58% | 59% | 54% | 51% | | Ohio | 18 | 0.7% | 0.7% | -0.6% | -0.9% | -1.9% | 44% | 37% | 34% | 32% | 31% | | Pennsylvania | 20 | 7.3% | 6.1% | 4.7% | 5.1% | 5.6% | 89% | 84% | 84% | 80% | 77% | | Texas | 38 | -1.5% | -2.4% | -1.2% | -0.8% | -1.5% | 28% | 19% | 27% | 31% | 32% | | Virginia | 13 | 12.6% | 11.3% | 10.8% | 10.8% | 9.7% | 98% | 96% | 97% | 95% | 94% | | Wisconsin | 10 | 7,2% | 6.6% | 6.6% | 6.5% | 5.4% | 91% | 88% | 87% | 85% | 81% |
Without these swing states Biden has 199 EVs. If we give him likely wins in New Hampshire, Minnesota, and Virginia, he has 232. In order, these are the most likely Biden wins: He needs 38 more.
Michigan 16 (8.0%, 93%)
Wisconsin 10 (7.2%, 91%)
Pennsylvania 20 (7.3%, 89%)
Nevada 6 (6.8%, 88%)
Florida 29 (4.5%, 76%)
Arizona 11 (3.9%, 68%)
You can see different combinations to get to 38, although the most likely is still Michigan, Wisconsin, and Pennsylvania. The big takeaways? 1) As you might expect, when the national polls are moving toward Biden, so are the state polls. Every state except Ohio moved in Biden's direction. While each movement might be considered within the margin of error for that state, when they all move in the same direction, that seems significant. 2) With the state polls moving Biden's way and the election getting closer, his win probabilities are moving higher, just as you would expect. 3) Florida, Florida, Florida. Who would have guessed that at this point Florida would look this good for Biden? 4) Right now Biden can survive a combined A) last minute move toward Trump, B) polling error, and C) voter suppression of 7% and still win the election. Of course, polling errors could mean that Biden is ahead even more. |
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Post by mhbruin on Oct 12, 2020 18:01:33 GMT -8
I don't remember who it was who posted they were concerned about Trump's rising approval rating. This is addressed by G. Eliott Morris
Trump’s job approval rating won’t save him
A popular argument about the polls being biased has one critical flaw
G. Elliott Morris
Oct 12
A popular argument about the polls being biased has one critical flaw
On one hand, it is hard to reckon with the idea that Joe Biden could win the election by 12 or 13 percentage points—yet is is also surprising that a president with so low of favorability ratings, and with as storied a presidency, as Donald Trump could even come anywhere close that. The tension between these two suppositions has been cause for quite a bit of handwringing on the modeling front this year. What estimates are more believable than others? What do we need to adjust for? Are there shy Trump voters—or, indeed, shy Biden voters?
Evidently I am not the only one who has faced these problems, and more. In The New Yorker this weekend, journalist Isaac Chotiner has published an interview with Sean Trende, the polling analyst at Real Clear Politics, that ponders similar questions.
I think the interview is quite insightful and I recommend that you read it, but Trende also falls into the trap of repeating a common argument about why polls might be underestimating support for Trump. Here it is in his words:
There’s also this question of Trump’s job approval, which is running two or three points ahead of his vote share. And, going back in time, Presidential job approval is one of the strongest indicators we have of how the President is going to fare. Who are these people that approve of the job he’s doing but aren’t going to vote for him? Again, you can tell yourself a story. There are people who like his policies, but hate his persona. But it could also be that these are voters who are saying they’re undecided, but they really aren’t. But, again, this is just kind of conjecture, it’s not really good evidence.
The logic goes that since Donald Trump’s approval rating is higher than his vote share, there might be some group of voters who approve of him but won’t say they’ll vote for him. Maybe, the implication is, these are the shy Trump voters we have been hearing about. Maybe they are even the reason polls were wrong in 2016!
This is an appealing argument, but it omits a few crucial points that I fear make the argument more about unsubstantiated “conjecture”—to use Trende’s own words about the angle—than a real concern.
The first is that the difference between Trump’s approval rating and his vote share is actually smaller than two or three points. Based on FiveThirtyEight’s average — which is better than Trende’s not least because it adjust for the fact that Rasmussen, a prominent approval pollster, almost always gives Trump a 10-point boost net boost — the residual is actually closer to one point. Today, 538 has Trump’s vote share at 42%, and his approval rating at 43%.
But the second point is about a more severe lack of context. It’s that there is also an identical difference between Donald Trump’s disapproval rating and Joe Biden’s vote share. Again according to 538, 53% of voters currently disapprove of the president, while Biden is winning 52% of the vote for president. The explanation? A higher rate of people answering that they “don’t know” or are undecided about their opinion on the ballot test compared to whether or not they approve of the president.
This calls the implication that Donald Trump has a potential upside with undecided voters (at least on these grounds) very much into question. If we are expecting Trump’s approval to be a guide for gaming out how undecideds will lean, then we have to conclude that there are at least as many people out there who will vote for Joe Biden than will vote for Donald Trump.
And that all sets aside that we have some actual data on how undecided voters—who would not be enough to save Trump even if he won them all—lean:
PI Prince Hal @piprincehal
I am not a “shy Trump” believer. But couldnt it be true that people who are currently “undecided” are more likely to end up in Trump column because of certain demographic alignment — i.e. may be low-information, low-education, etc.
G. Elliott Morris @gelliottmorris
This could be true in theory, but it’s not. In The Economist/YouGov’s polls, undecided voters are (a) younger, (b) less white, (c) more likely to vote in D than R primaries and (d) disapprove of Trump even more than the average decided voter.
There are much better arguments for why polls might be underestimating support for Trump — the best of them ranging from from bad weighting to bias caused by differential partisan non-response. I wouldn’t put much stock in this one if I were you.
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Post by grant73 on Oct 12, 2020 21:37:41 GMT -8
Women exist that don't want hubby to know that they (the wives) are not going to vote for Trump this time. I am talking about two situations. 1) Abusive husbands that would be angry about the wife actually having a choice, a vote. 2) Wives who are happy to keep the "harmony" at home by going along with the nightly Fox news and not showing disapproval of Trump. I don't think I am dreaming this up. For one thing, this recent larger disparity between current female polling much stronger for Biden than it was for Clinton -- it must come from somewhere. And I think that abusive households are more common than some assume. Secret Ballot, not so secret telephone polls.
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Post by northbruin40 on Oct 12, 2020 22:24:44 GMT -8
Women exist that don't want hubby to know that they (the wives) are not going to vote for Trump this time. I am talking about two situations. 1) Abusive husbands that would be angry about the wife actually having a choice, a vote. 2) Wives who are happy to keep the "harmony" at home by going along with the nightly Fox news and not showing disapproval of Trump. I don't think I am dreaming this up. For one thing, this recent larger disparity between current female polling much stronger for Biden than it was for Clinton -- it must come from somewhere. And I think that abusive households are more common than some assume. Secret Ballot, not so secret telephone polls. Another thing about the "Shy Trump Voter" theory is that some of the states where Trump most outperformed the 538 2016 prediction were deep red states where there is less to lose by stating support for Trump. You might expect shy Trump voters to be especially concentrated in deep blue states where there is good reason to hide your opinion. But that didn't happen in 2016. A better explanation for "surprise" results in 2016 is that in some states voter demographics were poorly represented in voting models. If 2012 was used as a basis for 2016 voter models, it could have a Democrat-friendly bias. If 2016 results are factoring into 2020 voter models, it becomes more difficult to duplicate the same error - unless there is a second wave of Trump support that exceeds what he already got in 2016. I've also stated in other posts that some of the "Trump miracle" in 2016 was actually captured in the late movement in polls, but the real-time analysis was sluggish, so we really didn't recognize it at the time - just as intelligence analysis was sluggish in December 1941, despite the clues being there. |
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